# Cohesion and Conflict

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One reason I always give this lecture without producing any notes is simply because the topic which I cover, 'Cohesion and Conflict', is too large to be covered in one hour, or in twenty pages of typescript, or anything short of a thousand page book. So the best I can do here is to present and comment on a few of the ideas and concepts which have accumulated under this heading. I will try to give you a few topics for future consideration when you attempt to deal with the problems of societies and what holds them together. More particularly, what I would like to talk about, in this class, is the relation of war to the problem of cohesion.

To begin with, however, it is important to note that the question of social cohesion is not something that one can lay out neatly under a few points and say that this, this and this factor will cause a society to cohere, to be solid, to be resistant to outside impact, or conversely, that such, such and such other factors will cause it to disintegrate under such and such conditions. Actually, almost any factor one can name can be a cause of cohesion under certain circumstances and a cause of disruption under others.

What is a prime example of this sort of thing? Well, just a short time ago we had ex-President Nixon sounding off in the press about the sad decay of cohesion in American society, and how a good little war might restore American self-confidence and pride. It may look like a new idea to you, but it is not at all. This idea, that

a good little victorious war holds a society together, is something that has been around for centuries. Moreover, it does work; under certain circumstances, it works very well.

We have a great many examples of countries and empires which were founded, and held together, on the basis of successful warfare. Take Germany, for instance; as a political concept, Germany is a very recent phenomenon. Until about the middle of the 19th century, there was no Germany, just a collection of German kingdoms, principalities and duchies of various sizes, animated by a vague concept of Germandom, but not a political entity at all. The political entity we know as Germany came into being in 1871 as a consequence of two successful wars waged by Prussia, one in 1866 against Austria, and the other in 1870 against France. It was these two successful wars that gave the Germans, as a whole, a feeling of unity, togetherness, a feeling of belonging to a single political concept based on being German. The feeling of pride and success engendered by these wars launched them on the path of statehood.

There are many other cases one can name (but I do not want to go into them here) in which successful warfare did cause great social cohesion. They caused societies to acquire the kind of unity that Nixon was really talking about. For that matter, even in American history, we can see that former wars in which the United States was victorious increased the sense of national identity, of national pride. It can also be argued that for Canada the success in repelling the Americans in 1812 was an important factor in creating the concept of Canadian identity and an awareness of being 'Canadian'. Even today, I imagine for some people, a look at Fort Henry and and the Murney Tower gives them a glow of pride: "We beat the bastards. We didn't let them in."

On the other hand, a lost war is a tremendous disintegrative factor. There are a great many cases where after a disastrous war a society breaks up. Revolution and anarchy may prevail, and possibly it will collapse as a political entity. It does not even have to be a large war which is lost. For instance, the Russian Empire got itself involved in a war with Japan in 1904, and by 1905 it was disgracefully defeated. It was not a big war; it was a limited war, and there was nothing vital involved for the Russian Empire. It was not in any danger of perishing at any time. There was no possibility of it being conquered and occupied by the Japanese. Despite this, the defeat very nearly caused the collapse of the Russian monarchy at this time. There was revolution. There was, for about a year and a half, tremendous disorder, and parts of the country for most of the time were outside the effective control of the government. The fact that it had been defeated created such disrespect,

such disregard for the government, that people simply lost their fear of it. In many areas, people simply ceased to obey and, in particular, national minorities, social and economic groups that had been opposed to the government, attempted to seize this moment to break away. They very nearly did so successfully. It was only after a long time and at a great cost that the government was able to restore unity. But only a few years later, Russia got itself involved in the First World War. Its defeat in this war was of much greater magnitude. The economic losses and strains imposed upon the nation between 1914 and 1917 were much larger. The result of that, in 1917, was once again revolution, and this time successful revolution. It was so successful, in fact, that it took seven years of strife to reunite the country and re-establish order within its borders. Parts of the state during this time broke away forever, and other parts broke away at least temporarily. Within the country itself, everything was topsy-turvy for several years. When order was finally restored, the old autocracy, the old monarchy and the old ruling classes, had vanished, and completely new power groups had come to the fore.

Here again, the Russian defeat was not crushing in the sense, let us say, that the defeat of France in 1940 was crushing. In 1940, one-half of France ended up under German occupation and the other half was effectively under German control. In 1917, in Russia, the disaster did not go nearly that far but, nevertheless, the society broke apart. So we can see that a victorious war can be, from the cohesive view point if not from the moral view point, a very good thing. A lost war, however, can be very, very bad indeed.

On the other hand, other societies lose wars and shrug it off. They may go through a period of apathy, they may go through a period of self-doubt, as, for instance, the United States is doing right now after VietNam, but they recover. The country does not disintegrate, and does not even noticeably falter in its unity. Why is it, then, that some societies are able to ride out such disasters, and others, with a much smaller impact, will nevertheless disintegrate? A lot of people study the problem, a lot of people worry about the question of cohesion, and there are as yet no really good answers. So much of the problem is subjective, so much depends on how a given society views certain factors in its existence.

Certainly there has been a great change in this century. Seventy years ago, this was considered a stable world, and a stable world is generally a cohesive world. Today, nobody would dare to claim that the world is stable. All you have to do is pick up the newspaper, and you see struggle around you. We see examples all the time of societies prying apart, of centrifugal forces tearing apart countries, and of new societies being unable to coalesce properly.

As we look at the newspapers today, there is, for instance, a three-cornered struggle going on in Angola; and yet what could be more unifying than a common struggle for independence? The fight against the Portuguese should have given the Angolans a feeling of unity, a feeling of common interest, which would keep them stable at least for a short while after independence. In this case, they did not even wait for independence in order to begin fighting each other. What the end of this will be is hard to foretell. In Lebanon, we see the two religious communities at each other's throats. Here we have a conflict which is a combination of religious conflict, Christians versus Moslems, and social conflict: the Moslems are essentially the poor, and the Christians control the most important sources of national wealth. In a way, this is the old struggle of the 'haves' versus the 'have-nots'. It is, of course, also a political struggle, a question of who is going to control the state. Yet, ironically, Lebanon, until recently, appeared to be the most stable and most successful of the Middle Eastern countries. If you go back five or ten years, you can find numerous articles praising its stability and expressing wonder how this 'Switzerland of the Middle East' was able to get on with relative peace and amity in the midst of all this Middle Eastern turmoil. Today, it is the most riven state in the Middle East.

In Ireland, we have had two religious communities at each other's throats for years now. Once more, the religious conflict is also at least partially a conflict of 'haves' versus 'have-nots' and a conflict over political control. In Cyprus, we see a divided island in a state of war, which has only been temporarily allaid, between the two communities, the Turkish and the Greek. It may yet lead, one of these days, to war between Turkey and Greece.

In Portugal, we see a potential revolution simmering away, a potential counter-revolution perhaps in Spain after Franco's death, in Bangladesh the situation is unresolved, and all over the world the situation is definitely unstable. Furthermore, internally in various countries, we see economic conflict, conflict between unions and employers, between government and unions; we see authoritarian governments in struggle against radical movements. Conflict of every kind exists almost everywhere you look. It is very difficult to pick out a stable country, to be able to point at it and say "Success at last". Apart from the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland, it is very hard to find success stories today from the viewpoint of cohesion.

That is why, you see, the subject is so vague and there are no real answers. Conflict is all around us, it comes in every size and every variety. Even situations which until recently were considered stable, at least which everyone took for granted as stable, have suddenly begun to come apart.

When we look at the problem of cohesion in historical perspective, we have to go back to primitive communities, primitive political structures. About the first social cohesion we observe is the family: blood ties. There are a couple of reasons for this sort of cohesion factor being so persistent and all-pervasive. One of them, of course, was that an as yet totally unorganized world was also a very dangerous world, because there was no mechanism of social protection, of protecting the ordinary person from violence and from his neighbours. The family formed a natural self-protective group. You could, at least, depend on your kinsmen to fight for you. It was then, to a large extent, a self-defense organization. It was also a welfare organization in a world in which, once more, the idea of social care was poorly developed. This idea has been with us, you know, for less than a century. Until then, it was the family that took care of its aged, its infirm and its infants. Here I am not talking simply of the nuclear family, father, mother and children, but rather of the extended family, the old-fashioned family, which included everybody from great-grandfather to great-grandson, with the enormous ramifications of uncles, cousins, second cousins, fifth cousins, including any sort of blood relation and relations by marriage as well. A clan, in other words.

The reason for the cohesiveness of the blood tie is most likely to be found in that their world was agricultural. It can still be found today in relatively primitive societies, ones that are primitive economically. The principal problem in an agricultural society is the ownership of land, the control of land and the inheritance of land. If the clan is not cohesive, if it fractures into individuals and small groups, then the land fractures as well. This is particularly aggravated by inheritance, if the land is being continuously divided up between parents and children. Very soon, the land allotment becomes so fractionalized that the plots are too small to support anyone. So the problem is always keeping land together, keeping land in the family in as large blocks as possible. The solution very often is, precisely, family cohesion, the vesting of ownership of land not in the individual but in the family or clan. The individuals are absorbed into larger groups, and have function and existence as members of this larger group. The group then becomes the centre for organizing labour and the centre for social protection for its members. This system functions very well in practical terms, and we find it, in one way or another, in every agricultural society, every economically primitive, backward society today and, of course, in every society before the industrial age. These societies tended to put great emphasis on the family and the blood tie as the principal factor of cohesion.

However, this factor, which led to great cohesion on the micro-level, could be an extremely disintegrative factor when one takes large units into consideration. It tended to imbue people with loyalty to the family, but to no one else. The concept then prevailed that it was really the family against the rest of the world. You owed no loyalty to people who were not connected with you by the blood tie and, in fact, their welfare was simply no concern of yours. Moreover, in an agricultural world, the horizons of people are very limited, rarely looking beyond the immediate village. Within the village, everyone is likely to be connected by blood or by marriage, and therefore fits into the definition of 'family'. But the village tends to be pretty self-sufficient. It needs very little from outside, and it can generally survive very happily without reference to anyone else. This limitation of horizons, this lack of interdependence with other similar units, can be an extremely divisive factor. People can get along with neighbouring villages or neighbouring counties, but under any sort of pressure this mutual interest collapses, and people withdraw once more into the small protective environment that they know. Consequently, what we do observe in rather primitive societies, in agricultural societies, is extremely tight ties within a clan or tribe, extremely tight ties within a village, but a tendency in an emergency for villages all to go their own way, and for any kind of larger unity that has been imposed by political units to vanish.

Now one large aspect of the internal collapse of the Russian state in 1917 was precisely this notion of withdrawal to a protective micro-environment. In 1917, it was still mostly a peasant state, and when things got rough, when the economy began to flag, when the political system began to malfunction, a very important factor was the tendency of the peasant to go back home and withdraw within the protective confines of the village. In effect, he ceased to concern himself with what went on outside. He left the larger decisions to the city people, letting them fight it out. Most of the peasants during the Russian revolution were passive, and were neutral in the sense that they did not participate in the struggle. They did not fight for the communists or the anti-communists; it wasn't really their business. The only time they concerned themselves was when somebody trespassed on their own fields, and then they might decide to fight. If they did decide to fight, it was not on any political grounds, but simply on the grounds of defending their own crops and nothing else. Even the concern of the next village was none of their business; it had to fend for itself.

This is a factor which may be serving again today, say in Angola. In the present political struggle, most of the population simply is not involved. The real

decision will be taken by the very few thousand politically committed people, whereas the mass of the rural population, the millions of villagers, are not going to do anything to decide one way or another. They probably already have gone very far in the direction of this mechanism of dropping out of any political process, of withdrawing within themselves, and of waiting for someone else to solve the problem for them.

The rise of large political organizations in the ancient world was connected with the institution of monarchy. Throughout most of history, you find monarchy prevalent. It is only in rare circumstances, for instance, in Classical Greece or Renaissance Italy, that we find republican government of a sort appearing, and political power being decentralized among the citizenry. Monarchy has been accepted as the system of government by most of the world's population throughout history. However, it was a system which never involved to any great extent the loyalty of the population at large. People might become involved to some degree with the destiny, the fortunes of dynasty X or dynasty Y, but it did not make a terrible lot of difference to the ordinary person.

In fact, if we look at European history, say in the thousand years from 800 to 1800, we notice that dynasties come and dynasties go, boundaries shift back and forth over the map, and it doesn't seem to make any difference to the societies that are being politically partitioned and repartitioned. People tended to accept a system in which they had very little role in the decision-making process, and to accept rule from above. They had very little influence on who was going to be their political master from one year to the next. Therefore, they generally accepted as ruler whomever it pleased God or the fortunes of war to place over them at this particular moment. If, next year, war caused a redrawing of boundaries and they found themselves shifted to the jurisdiction of somebody else, they accepted that. The only principle which therefore could logically be applied to the question of social cohesiveness under such circumstances was to be loyal to whoever was your ruler at the given moment. If the ruler changed, you were loyal to the new lot for just as long as they could effectively exercise control over you.

Once again, this sort of approach to politics can be cohesive under certain circumstances, particularly if your dynasty is victorious, if it generates a mood of confidence and attracts to itself the loyalty of people who find that there are benefits to be obtained from this kind of relationship. But, on the other hand, a reversal of fortune can disintegrate this kind of political entity with great speed. People tend to very quickly abandon a sinking ship if they feel no special commitment, no special interest, no special tie binding them to this particular political

mechanism. Of course, this kind of concept of political power, the concept that you should accept and be loyal to whatever ruler political fortune had assigned you at a given moment, tended to create political entities in which the only unifying factor had been the fortunes of war or possibly the vagaries of inheritance. Your old Duke only had daughters, the daughter married Count Y, who happened to have a little principality five hundred miles away. The old Duke died, Count Y inherited the duchy, and you found yourself ruled from some place five hundred miles away. Or possibly the old Duke had only one son. He married his daughter off to the son of Count Y, five hundred miles away, because it did not seem to matter. The old Duke died. The Duke's son, his heir, happened to come down with pneumonia, and five days later he was dead. Now the Duke's daughter was the heir, and her husband would become the ruler. By this process, many ruling houses in Europe accumulated a vast collection of real estate, scattered all over the map of Europe, and including people of all sorts of languages, all sorts of religions and all sorts of derivations. This was accepted as the natural process, and so the normal situation until fairly recently was a political system of multinational states. It was a system under which any given dynasty tended to rule territories composed of people of diverse language, very often of diverse religion, and in which the only real unifying factor was the personage of the ruler. Now such states, in some cases, existed successfully over a long period of time, but they were successful only as long as people tended to disregard nationality and language as factors of importance in social and political life. This situation prevailed roughly until about the year 1800.

A much more important factor until about 1800 was the question of religion. Religion tended to be a cohesive factor because people believed in the same gods. People who felt themselves protected by the same gods tended naturally to stick together. However, throughout a large part of history, there existed considerable tolerance in the matter of religion; people did not generally go in for massacring other people simply because their religion was different. Principally, for a long time, the concept of God was very similar to the concept of monarchy. One accepted the local ruler, and similarly, one accepted the local god. Gods had territorial jurisdiction just as rulers did; it was felt that their power was limited geographically. In other words, the concept of a universal god, the concept of a god who transcended national boundaries and who, therefore, could justifiably claim jurisdiction over the inhabitants of another city or principality, did not really evolve until relatively modern times, well after the beginning of the Christian era.

The Christians were really the first people to come up with the concept of a universal god, and it took them several centuries to make it stick. However, once they had successfully taken over the Roman Empire, they did begin to apply force to others in order to convert them. Soon thereafter, Islam arrived as the next would-be universal religion, one with a god with universal jurisdiction, and it also adopted the concept that it is legitimate to coerce people to the true faith. Thereafter, I should say from the year 500 or 600 onwards, religious war becomes a fairly common phenomenon. People now strive over questions of religious doctrine, and we find religion a very divisive factor when any state, any political unit, contains people of more than one faith. The concept of religious tolerance, the concept that one can get along in one state despite religious diversity, that is to say, that other interests, other binding ties can override religious difference, is a fairly modern concept. It really has been on the scene only for the last 300 years and only in, say, the last 150 years has it been fairly generally accepted. I say "fairly generally", because even today we can observe a great many people who do not accept religious tolerance at all. They would still feel far happier in a religiously homogeneous situation, and will very often take to arms in order to impose their religious dominance.

About two hundred years ago, a new concept began to make its way in the world, and that was the concept of language as the real unifying factor. Modern nationalism is essentially linguistic nationalism; it claims the allegiance of people not on the basis of religion, not on the basis of rule by a particular personality, not on the basis of inhabitating a fairly small and compact territory, not on the basis of blood or race, but on the basis of the language people speak. It is, in a way, a logical concept; one is much more likely to have common interests and emotional ties with people whom one can understand. But it is interesting that it becomes the basis of nationalism, the accepted basis for political organization, only in the last one hundred and fifty years. It arises just about the time of the French Revolution. It takes time to get itself established, and by about 1830 or 1840 it is pretty prevalent throughout Europe, although the old concept still fights a very strong rearguard action.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire was the last major multinational unit in Europe which still attempted to maintain its existence despite the fact that it was multinational in the sense of being multilingual. It stuck it out until 1918, and then fell apart, once more under the pressure of war. Despite all the discontent, despite the claims of the component nationalities, despite the political strife that took

place within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it did manage to cohere successfully until the 20th century, and it even rode out the impact of a number of unsuccessful minor wars without collapsing. It was the First World War that finished it. The social and economic impact of this war was simply too large for a society to stick together against the claims of the component linguistic groups.

Oddly enough, we still have in existence today a number of multilingual states, and I am speaking here only of what one might call the European World, in which term I include North America. Canada is one example, Belgium is another, and Switzerland is a third. Switzerland has always been produced as the example of a successful multilingual country, a country where language has not provoked centrifugal forces strong enough to break it apart. Well, Switzerland is an anomaly. A good study of what keeps the Swiss together in a world where linguistic groups tend to go their own way would be very useful. We could go into a long historical analysis, we could say that common historical experience, that a general lack of economic conflict, had to be the condition under which the Swiss could minimize the impact of language. In fact, the Swiss have fought each other over the question of religion as late as 1847, but linguistic nationalism they somehow managed to ride out. They seem, however, to be the only ones who have done so with some success while retaining a democratic form of government and freedom of expression.

Belgium was considered another success story until recently. The Belgians managed to hold together throughout history without having language make much difference. Even when linguistic nationalism appears on the scene, at the time of Belgium's independence in 1830, Belgium becomes independent as one country. It does not break apart into French-speaking and Flemish-speaking states. The Belgians felt that their common history, their common economic unity and their common religion were far more important than their linguistic problem.

Throughout the 19th century, Belgium was another example of cohesion despite linguistic difference. The First World War made no difference in this regard; the Belgians came through it with flying colours. In fact, here was a case of war as a unifying factor, despite the national disasters. Even the German invasion and occupation in the First World War gave the Belgians a feeling of shared experience, of common resistance to a common enemy. The magnificent fight put up by the Belgian Army, the refusal to surrender, the fact that they stuck it out, hung on to their last scrap of national territory until final victory in 1918, were considered to have greatly strengthened the state. They gave the Belgians a feeling of pride, of self-respect, and a much higher concept of national unity. The Second World War,

with a second German invasion and occupation, was felt to have accomplished much the same thing, to have reinforced the gains made in the First World War. This, however, proved to be a false assumption.

Only a few years after the Second World War, Belgium split along linguistic lines, and we find the Flemings and the French-speaking Walloons pitted against each other. At one point, the conflict became so sharp that everyone predicted that the country was about to fall apart. It very nearly did. There is no guarantee that it may not do so if something happens to renew the conflict a few years from now. Suddenly, in the middle of the 20th century, in an era when, according to all the prophets, internationalism should have been advancing, when national differences should have been vanishing, when people should have been marching together into future greater unity, the Belgians turned the other way. The question of linguistic community became suddenly so important that a great many Belgians were perfectly willing to sacrifice national unity and to let the other lot go.

The most conspicuously successful multinational state today is the Soviet Union; another example would be Yugoslavia. Both these states would claim that the secret of their success lies in their adoption of a federal political structure and of freedom of cultural self-expression for all the component nationalities. But one suspects that the real secret is a combination of coercion and of total control of the media, which prevents the ideas of the linguistic separatists from being disseminated and infecting others. Even so, strains have always existed in both countries, weakening cohesion. This has become very evident in Yugoslavia with a series of trials of nationalists in recent years. In the case of the Soviet Union, we have seen that some of the nationalities tried to break away during the Revolution of 1917. Ever since, right up to the present day, we periodically hear of trials of various national separatists in the Soviet Union. During the Second World War, separatists from several of the nationalities attempted, through collaboration with the invading Germans, to split the Soviet Union and obtain independence for their peoples. Here we can again note the importance of war as a factor in cohesion. The pressures of war, particularly when defeats occur, weaken the moral and psychological fabric of cohesion in the state, and the strains of linguistic nationalism, which could be successfully absorbed in peacetime, will then have much greater and perhaps fatal impact.

Canada, again, until fairly recently was generally considered a going concern, a united country despite the language difference, and, of course, a few years ago this was proved to be a similarly false assumption. We had a great many people

predicting that Canada would fall apart within six months, or twelve months, or eighteen months. It has not yet, but nobody can guarantee that it never will. Here, again, war was of great importance in bringing out starkly the weakness in the web of cohesion. The conscription crises in both the First and Second World Wars laid bare the gap between the Anglophone and Francophone communities. Wars have a particularly stimulating effect on communal conflict in multinational states, because it often happens that the component nationalities do not perceive the war in the same terms; they may not feel equally menaced, or may not feel that their interests are equally advanced by the war. Thus one nationality may be blamed by the others for provoking the war or for deriving undue benefits from it. Since war demands the supreme sacrifice from all participants, a nationality may prefer to split the state rather than get killed for reasons which it does not perceive as sufficient. To the Francophones, both World Wars were Anglophone, not Canadian, wars, and they did not feel obliged to participate. To the Anglophones, Francophones who refused to fight were unpatriotic, cowardly and contemptible. The result was a dangerous strain on the unity of Canada. Similarly, in Yugoslavia in 1941, the Serbs were blamed by the other component nationalities for having involved the country in war with Germany for purely Serbian reasons, and the resulting conflict almost destroyed the concept of Yugoslavia as a multinational state. So, suddenly, one sees a new divisive force appear, which seems to negate the former assumptions of cohesiveness and which reaffirms once more that linguistic cohesiveness seems to be the most important tie in the 20th century. Under the political principles which seem to govern today, which are essentially 19th century Western European political concepts, this has become the dominant factor.

Another type of transformation has, of course, occurred since 1800 in European and North American society and is gradually occurring in the rest of the world. This is the economic transformation from an essentially agricultural, primitive type of society to an industrialized, urbanized society. Once more, the question arises: "What has been the effect of this transformation on the problem of unity, on the problem of social cohesiveness?" I have said that in the agricultural world, cohesiveness is very high at the low societal level, particularly at the land ownership level, the village level, but that it tends to be rather weak above this relatively small unit. It would stand to reason, then, that as we switch away from an agricultural society, that as we switch away from a society based on ownership and cultivation of land to a society based on landless families, on urban families living in houses or rented accommodations and producing essentially labour, the unity, the cohesiveness

based on blood ties would largely disintegrate. And, in fact, this is what has happened.

We have seen the disintegration of the clan and tribal system in favour of the nuclear family. Today, a lot of people seem to predict the disintegration of the nuclear family in favour of isolated individuals. This transformation process can very easily be observed in any of the so-called 'underdeveloped countries', when you have a look at the impact which industrialization always has on a primitive agricultural society. If the society is tribal, we see detribalization, we see the disappearance of tribal ties, we see people becoming disintegrated into a mass of individuals, but ending up confused, isolated, and with no allegiance whatever. The tribesman who goes to the city and becomes an urban worker in a factory or mine, very quickly loses tribal identity, and the result is this amorphous mass of detribalized, disoriented individuals. When the peasants who are used to thinking in terms of the clan, of the extended family, of group living, of group allegiance, move to the city and become industrial workers, they very soon lose this allegiance. They no longer keep track of all their cousins and of the ramifications of the marriage connections in their family. They soon become reduced to nuclear family units which look after themselves and seem to care very little for anyone else.

This was inevitable in the sort of society we live in, an industrialized society. It is, for one thing, highly mobile; people travel, people move from one end of the country to the other, making it difficult to maintain blood connections, maintain the family tie. Similarly, when the principal form of property that people care about and worry about dividing among their children is not land but cash, or property that can easily be converted into cash, the old justification for the clan, for keeping the family together in order to keep the land holdings together, similarly disappears.

So we get the disintegration of cohesiveness on the low level. But what about cohesiveness on the higher level? In industrial society, we could expect it to become much greater, because an industrial society is highly interdependent economically and socially. People have to interact and depend on each other to a degree which is incredible to a villager. They have to depend on the functioning of the complex economy, of economic units thousands of miles away, in order simply to stay alive. All the vital functions of living, being able to find food in the stores tomorrow, the certainty that the light will go on when you flick the switch, the certainty that the oil will be delivered so you do not freeze in the winter, all this depends on a highly complex interdependence between individuals and producing units. It depends on trust

that other people will do their job if you do yours. It is precisely this kind of economic interdependence that gave people the hope of a greater social cohesiveness extending to higher and higher levels, and eventually transcending political boundaries. It was this hope, again, which led socialist theoreticians to believe that former divisive factors would soon be discarded or would become minor.

Yet, again, whereas this process seemed to work quite well for a long time, and we did observe the coalescence of small units into greater units as international co-operation was fostered and supranational organizations, such as the European Common Market were formed, this presumably unifying factor, this presumably cohesive factor has also proved somewhat misleading. For instance, when we look at the internal situation, we see that the technological, industrialized world has introduced new factors of strife; the struggle between labour unions and employers, the problems of industrialists versus environmentalists, the problems of governmental control of society, the problems of 'haves' versus 'have nots', the problems of rich versus poor countries, and the problems of the poorest 20% versus the privileged elite. All this has created new sources of strife which people, say, fifty years ago did not visualize. Moreover, as a unifying factor it has proved to be a double-edged weapon, like the question of religion, the question of linguistic nationalism and the question of war. Economic interdependence at first appeared to lead us into a new world of unity. Today, instead, it seems to provide new seeds of conflict, which tomorrow may very well finish us all.

The effects of industrialization also can be observed with regard to the problem of war. On the one hand, highly industrialized states, with this highly developed feelings of interdependence among the population, of integration into a great, complex national structure, have the cohesion necessary to ride out the stresses of war, even of national defeat, successfully without disintegrating. For one thing, the citizens of an industrialized state feel they have so much at stake in the system that they feel committed to protect and defend it; they cannot withdraw into a micro-environment like agricultural villagers. Also, increased literacy and education are concomittant of industrialization, and lead to the population being better informed, or indoctrinated, about national goals and interests, and therefore more involved and patriotic. In effect, populations in industrialized countries have, on the whole, achieved a consensus as to their social and political institutions, and this allows them to absorb the impact of war. The best illustration of this effect is the Soviet Union. In 1905 and 1917, agricultural Russia could not absorb the stresses of war, and collapsed into turmoil and revolution. In the Second World War, the now largely

industrialized Soviet Union did not collapse. Despite far greater initial military disasters, far greater economic strain, huge population losses and the occupation of a large part of the country by the enemy, it went on fighting and producing until the final victory.

On the other hand, the technological revolution has also affected the conduct of war and has made it incomparably more expensive and economically demanding. Given the economic interdependence in the social structure of an industrialized state, the effects of the economic requirements of war will inevitably be propagated throughout the whole population, and will affect everyone in the form of taxation, shortages, rationing and inflation. The stresses of war will then accentuate the existing conflicts within an industrialized population and will give them greater scope, just as they give greater scope to linguistic nationalism, and in this way will weaken social cohesion. This will particularly occur if the economic impact of war is seen to fall unequally on different social groups. The crushing cost of modern war is still imperfectly realized, since all wars in the last thirty years have been limited wars; but even the burden of the limited VietNam war on the economy of the United States, the wealthiest country in the world, can be seen to have been highly detrimental. It led to economic dislocation, inflation, instability of the dollar; it forced the government to make financial cuts in areas such as education, medicine, research and development, with repercussions which will persist for a long time; and it caused much internal turmoil and strife. Thus we can perceive, at least partially, that the cost of a full-scale modern war, even a relatively short one, and even without the employment of nuclear weapons and the consequent destruction, could easily cause the economic bankruptcy of an industrialized state and the collapse of normal economic functions; and this, in turn, despite the greater internal strength of the industrialized state, would be bound to cause the collapse of social cohesion, just as in Russia in 1917.

Consequently, I have no real lessons to offer on the problem of cohesiveness. There is no universal prescription, there is no neat set of formulae, there is no simple set of factors I can outline for you like A, B, C. In effect, each case has to be studied on its own. Each case has to be examined, especially, in historical perspective. Each particular society has to be studied in order to discover the roots, the particular combination of factors, which produced unity in one case and produce this divisiveness today.